

G-2 report.

3,020-d.  
x-6,000 etc.

NICARAGUA (Combat)

Subject: The Nicaraguan  
Revolution. (Military  
Situation)

From: M/A Nicaragua

Report No. 23 March 20,  
1927.



1. ACTIVITIES:

The only activities of importance since my last report were the fights at San Geronimo and Tierra Azul.

(a) On the night of March 13/14 a Liberal force of about 800 men with 25 machine guns, under command of Generals Muller, a Latvian; Escamilla, said to be a Mexican; [...] Mena, son of the famous Nicaraguan general, made a night march from Muymuy and at daylight March 14th, attacked the Conservative force of 700 men and 20 machine guns at San Geronimo. Generals Reyes and Estrada were in command of the Conservatives. After about six hours of severe fighting the Liberals withdrew, the Conservatives capturing 2 machine guns, 80 rifles and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. About an hour later the Liberals returned and attacked vigorously. This second fight lasted until about 3 o'clock p.m., when both sides withdrew. The Conservatives claim the victory, and explain they withdrew because their ammunition was exhausted. The Conservatives withdrew to Mina Verde to reorganize and later to San Ramon, where they now are. The

Liberals withdrew to Muymuy and later to Matiguas.

The Conservatives report that they lost 27 killed and 38 badly wounded, and that the Liberals lost at least 100 men. The Conservatives also report having found among the enemy dead 7 Mexicans, identified by tattoo marks, clothing, jewelry and their cheering for Calles during the fighting; 1 German and 3 Costa Ricans.

As General Reyes came to Managua to report on the battle in person to the President, I am inclined to the belief that the Liberals surprised him and that he has overestimated their strength and underestimated his own.

(b) The forces under General Viquez, Conservative, attacked those under Sandoval, Liberal, at Tierra Azul on March 15th, but Sandoval withdrew his forces without much resistance.

(c) On March 16th a small band of Liberals captured near Sebaco two automobiles of the Conservatives loaded with 12,000 rounds of ammunition, and escaped toward Rateli with their prize.

## 2. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN: (6,700-d)

As a result of the fight at San Geronimo, about 5 miles northeast of Muymuy, on March 14th, and the one at Tierra Azul on March 15th, the Liberals have withdrawn from Muymuy and Moncada's entire force of about 1,200 men is reported to be at Matiguas and vicinity.

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The Conservative forces on March 18th were located as follows: Tierra Azul 1,600 under General Viques, who is one of the leading Conservative Generals; Boaco 200; Teustepe 150; Las Banderas 178; Las Maderas 50; San Ramon, 5 miles east of Matagalpa,



800 under General Reyes; Jinotega 300; Ciudad Dario 350; Tipitapa 600 under general Rivers Delgadillo, to be increased by 400 men in two or three days.

General C. Rivers Delgadillo left Managua for Tipitapa on March 18 with 400 men, 6 Browning machine guns and one 42 mm cannon. Upon his arrival at Tipitapa the garrison of 200 men there will pass to his command. He will remain there two or three days pending the arrival of 400 additional men from the Departments of Masaya and Carazo.

The plan is for General C. Rivers Delgadillo to assemble 1,000 men at Tipitapa, which is 18 miles east of Managua, and move as soon as possible on Matiguas by way of Matagalpa, it is my opinion that general Rivers Delgadillo's force will not reach its destination until about the 1st of April. Whether Moncada will attack before the concentration is completed is problematical, but if he does not it is almost a certainty that the government will wait until Delgadillo gets within supporting distance, which will be at least eight or ten days.

The Conservative plan is based on the theory, which appears to be about correct, that Moncada cannot subsist his forces in the territory east and north of Matiguas, and that if he moves from there at all the movement must be either to the southwest toward Managua or to the west toward Matagalpa, and their forces are well disposed to prevent such movements.

With 1,600 men at Tierra Azul and 800 at San Ramon, both within striking distances of Moncada, I think the Conservatives should attack him without delay, but they have decided to wait until General Rivers Delgadillo joins them with his force of 1,000 men from Tipitapa.

If Moncada can be held near Matiguas until Delgadillo arrives the

Conservatives will be able to attack him with between 3,500 and 4,000 men and either destroy or capture his entire force.

Unless Moncada's force is captured or destroyed within the next week or two it is probable that it will split up into small bands and resort to banditry and guerilla warfare, which may be continued almost indefinitely.

3. RECRUITMENT: (6,240-b)

The Conservatives have been mobilizing and equipping recruits at Managua for the past three weeks at the rate of about 200 men per day. These recruits are being sent to the various forces in the field in detachments of from 100 to 300 men in an attempt to concentrate as large a force as possible for the much talked of decisive battle with the Liberals under Moncada in the vicinity of Muymuy.

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As the total number of men in the Conservative army remains about the same, 5,500 men, and as they have had no engagements worth mentioning and therefore have suffered very few battle casualties, it is my opinion that their recruitment rate equals that of their desertions.

4. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION: (6,180-a)

The Government forces are reported to total 6,725 men and the Liberal forces are variously estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000 men. My estimate is 5,500 for Government and not to exceed 1,500 for Liberals.

The disposition of both forces is shown as of March 8, 11, 15 and 18 in the attached table and as of Mar. 8 and 18 on the attached situation maps.

## 5. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE: (6,300)

Due to lack of interest in the war, lack of pay, irregularity of supply and absence of training, the discipline and morale of the government forces is poor. That of the Liberals is thought to be slightly better.

## 6. NATIONAL GUARD: (6,100-a)

Twenty-eight student officers and men of the National Guard are actively engaged with the troops at the front. They are used as aids to general officers, machine gunners, etc.

On March 18, 100 men of the National Guard with 3 machine guns were sent by truck to Matagalpa and San Ramon to guard the line of communications for General Salvador Reyes, but they probably will be employed for combat duty.

The officers and men of the National Guard or Constabulary, due to their training and high morale, are much more dependable than are those of the army.

## 7. GENERAL OFFICERS: (6,200-b)

The outstanding Conservative Generals appear to be Bartolomo Viquez, Carlos Rivers Delgadillo, Salvador Reyes and Noguera Gomez. Those of the revolutionists appear to be Jose Maria Moncada, Luis Boltran Sandoval and Recamilla.

## 8. AIR FORCE: (6,100-a)

The Government Air Force has been reduced from two serviceable and one unserviceable "swallow" planes to one serviceable plane. There are no spare parts or facilities for repairing the unserviceable planes.

Sources: American Legation, Nicaraguan Govt., Major Rodriguez, other reliable informants & personal observation.

3 enclosures.

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